It had its origins in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which was established in 1983 by Ronald Reagan and which was headed by Lt. General James Alan Abrahamson. This includes moving ahead on aggressive schedules when key technologies are not yet properly developed. In 2020, DOD determined that modifications to MDA's acquisition flexibilities were needed to better balance risk. A final unmentioned item worthy of policy guidance relates to production. Also missing are the usual recitations about arms control. Slovakia, moreover, likely needs new defenses to replace the S-300 units it donated to Ukraine. All rights reserved. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is the section of the United States government's Department of Defense responsible for developing a layered defense against ballistic missiles. Organizational Chart In addition, the agency delivered 83 percent of the assets it planned to deliver by the end of fiscal year 2009. Other notable absences include the usual reference to arms control limitations, the need for increasing production quantities, the need for maintaining flexible acquisition authorities, and specifics on who exactly will manage this new missile defeat enterprise. Progress is reflected in greater attention to newer capability and mission areas. For example, early alignment of MDA programs to warfighter-approved requirements helps ensure delivery of needed capabilities while minimizing the risk of late-cycle design changeswhich has proven to raise cost and create schedule delaysor delivering capabilities that do not fully meet warfighter's needs. For more information, contact John Sawyer at (202) 512-4841 or SawyerJ@gao.gov. By providing these baselines, MDA met the intent of our recommendation and included key performance dates for the Ballistic Missile Defense System. AMD is necessary not only for fixed infrastructure, but for joint maneuver forces. It is all well and good to move swiftly around the battlefield, but loitering munitions and cruise missile targeting has dramatically improved. For example, MDA must now obtain independent cost estimates and Under Secretary of Defense approval of its acquisition strategies. GAO reviewed DOD documents and policies issued in 2020 and interviewed DOD officials. North America is a region, too, and cruise missile defense for the homeland is a capability the United States has neglected for too long. As Assistant Secretary Plumb said in May, Missiles have become a common and expected facet of modern warfare, which makes missile defeat and missile defense efforts more important than ever. If the Trump MDR foundered for disconnects from budgets and programs, the Biden MDR deserves similar scrutiny so that these capabilities do not remain paper programs. Building on our heritage of providing reliable launch vehicles, Northrop Grumman is a leading provider of interceptors and targets used in the test and verification of the nation's missile defense systems and interceptor boosters employed in the defense of the homeland against long-range ballistic missile attacks. The scope of the review included panel discussions with leadership from the Army; Navy; Air Force; Joint Staff; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, After completing studies in 2019, DOD revised those flexibilities in 2020 by making significant changes to MDA's requirements-setting and acquisition processes (see figure). However, we noted in our report that several DOD components agreed with our recommendation and that the Joint Staff was considering implementing a process that could potentially address our recommendation. When one must defend what one cannot move or hide, fixed emplacements may be good enough. Since MDA was established in 2002, DOD has invested over $174 billion developing and fielding missile defense capabilities. These challenges include: MDA is at a pivotal crossroads, needing to balance its ability to pursue new and advanced efforts while also maintaining its existing portfolio. To improve missile defense acquisitions, we have made 61 recommendations since 2010, of which 23 remain open. It also corrects the 2019 MDRs insufficient attention to integration, air defense layering for cruise missile and UAS threats, and survivability. In the June 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), Missile Defense Agency (MDA) provided cost, schedule, and performance baselines for the acquisition of each new class of target. One of the strengths of the 2019 MDR was its broader description of missile threats, to include ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. The Fort Belvoir, Virginia-based MDA team works . In fiscal year 2018, Congress approved $11.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency, an increase of $3.6 billion, or 46 percent, from the Trump administration's May 2017 initial budget request. GAO has previously reported on MDA's process to acquire assets and capabilities for this system. Following the overarching theme of the 2022 NDS, the MDR describes missile defenses as a critical component of integrated deterrence, defined as a framework bringing together all instruments of national power. Recent Acquisition Policy Changes Balance Risk and Flexibility, but Actions Needed to Refine Requirements Process. 1701. The brevity of the 2022 review means that it leaves several issues unmentioned. This MDR has three parts: the first addresses the evolving air and missile threat environment, the second, the U.S. strategy and policy framework, and the third, ways to strengthen international cooperation. Weve reported on MDA every year since 2002 and found it has fallen short of its goals, in part because of the high-risk approach it takes to developing these systems. In the June 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), Missile Defense Agency (MDA) provided more complete unit costs by including program acquisition unit costs. As seen in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Iranian attacks in 2019, and the Ukrainian war this year, that neglect is no longer tenable. Unimplemented GAO Recommendations on Missile Defense Acquisitions by Year, 2010-2022. 2022 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This report assesses the effects of recent changes DOD made to missile defense non-standard acquisition processes and responsibilities and whether, in doing so, it met the statutory requirements. The appropriation is the largest Congress has ever provided for the agency after adjusting for inflation. The warfighter (military planners and weapon system operators) also now has greater requirements-setting responsibility. This statement highlights key findings from GAO's work on missile defense acquisitions. Homeland ballistic missile defense is here to stay. Stay informed as we add new reports & testimonies. Our workforce includes approximately 7,150 personnel (2,359 government, 168 military, 3,172 contractors, and 1,451 other governmental agency staff In our December 2015 report on the status of MDA's cost estimating practices, we noted that over half of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs presenting resource baselines in the agency's 2014 Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR) have not received independent cost estimates from the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). The Department of Defense Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo) is a human resource management system that provides the MDA with the right tools to motivate and retain the high-quality workforce for which it strives. 5 Attachment 2 . Despite these problems, MDA proceeded with production and fielding of assets. GAO also found that DOD generally met the statutory requirements Congress established for changing missile defense non-standard acquisition processes and responsibilities by: (a) consulting with required DOD officials; (b) certifying this consultation occurred; (c) reporting the changes to Congress; and (d) generally waiting the required 120 days before implementing the changes. Published: Mar 12, 2020. Feb 2022 - Present10 months. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is a research, development, and acquisition agency within the United States Department of Defense. The 2022 MDR does, however, acknowledge the need for adaptive acquisition approaches. Rescinding the Trump DTM would help protect such approaches. Since MDA was established in 2002, DOD has spent over $174 billion to develop a network of sensors, interceptors, and command and control capabilities collectively called the Missile Defense System. As MDA implements its initiatives to improve transparency, accountability, and oversight, and begins efforts to manage and oversee MDA at the element level, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA to develop and report to Congress in the annual BMDS Accountability Report the dates at which performance baselines will be achieved. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reported acquisition baselines for program elements or major subprograms in the engineering and the manufacturing development phase and the production and deployment phase in the 2012 Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (BMDS) Accountability Report (BAR). Recognition in a policy document of how adversary air and missile threats could suppress and disintegrate active defenses is long overdue. That paragraph highlights modern over-the-horizon radars for improving warning and tracking against cruise missile and other threats to the homeland. The same criterion must be applied to the emerging space sensors. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently directed the establishment of a new missile defense capability requirements process that includes the production of initial requirements documents. The Missile Defense Agency is developing a Ballistic Missile Defense System to protect against ballistic and hypersonic missile attacks. European countries who have given their air defenses to Ukraine, for instance, will no doubt be expecting a backfill. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has already committed to production of SM-3 IB missile by awarding the contract for production. NATOs air defense initiatives signal a demand for significant procurement and the potential for collaborative and bulk approaches. It is not good enough to provide strategic and theater missile warning and tracking. Sensor architectures must also support fire control. Download the Brief The Issue The 2022 budget request for missile defense and defeat seeks, but does not yet achieve, alignment with the reality of long-term strategic competition. GAO has previously recommended that MDA take steps to increase transparency and align its acquisition approach to reduce high-risk practices. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 included a provision for GAO to assess whether DOD complied with these requirements. Whether the Biden administration will properly resource and implement the goals of its MDR and NDS is now the question. The full tasking is described in Chapter I. It features a nose-mounted sensor suite for target acquisition and night vision systems.It is armed with a 30 mm (1.18 in) M230 chain gun carried between the main landing gear, under the aircraft's forward . This DTM will expire effective March 1, 2023. . It remains to be seen whether the Air Force moves out to field not just sensors but active defenses for CMD-H. Tom Karako is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Commentaryis produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. You can browse or search our information by relevant agency . In providing comments on our report, the agency concurred with this recommendation, but has not taken all the actions necessary to implement it. The MDRs policy direction does not seem to address who will manage the departments missile defeat enterprise. The memorandum also describes a timeline of planned events for implementing the new process throughout 2022 and into 2023. By law, GAO is directed to assess the annual progress the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made in developing and fielding the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). If these initiatives are implemented in accordance with knowledge-based acquisition principles, an opportunity exits to improve the BMDS acquisition by ensuring MDA programs begin with realistic, transparent plans and baselines.
Actions that satisfy the intent of the recommendation have been taken.
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While the intent of the recommendation has not been satisfied, time or circumstances have rendered the recommendation invalid.
, Executive Candidate Assessment and Development Program. GAO also assessed MDA's progress toward improving accountability and transparency in agency operations, management processes, and its acquisition strategy. Missile Defense Agency is a function of the U.S. Department of Defense that concentrates on missile weaponry research, development and acquisition. We testified that MDA has improved its approach to these acquisitions but still uses aggressive schedules and other risky practices. The new process could potentially address the full intent of our recommendation and we will monitor the Joint Staff's progress in implementing the new requirements process. washington citing a disconnect between the missile defense agency's fiscal 2021 budget request and what it would need to meet national defense strategy goals, congress has injected $1.3. Although the agency concurred with this recommendation, officials recently informed us that they will not report capability deliveries. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) provided the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with flexibilities to diverge from traditional requirements-setting and acquisition processes and instead implement a unique approach to managing its acquisitions. New missile defense tech comes with acquisition risks The sixth Space Based Infrared System Geosynchronous Earth Orbit satellite sits atop its Atlas V rocket for launch Aug. 4, 2022. While such delivery declarations can provide insight into performance of the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) elements, they do not describe the capability of these assets working as an integrated ballistic missile defense system. The test problems also precluded MDA from gathering key knowledge and affected development of advanced algorithms and homeland defense. Although the public version of the review leaves much to be desired, it nevertheless advances several critical mission areas: a comprehensive approach to missile defeat, homeland cruise missile defense, the defense of Guam, and distributed operations. As MDA implements its initiatives to improve transparency, accountability, and oversight, and begins efforts to manage and oversee MDA at the element level, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA to update DOD's Plan to Enhance the Accountability and Transparency of the Ballistic Missile Defense Program to reflect MDA's current initiatives and include dates for fulfilling each commitment. The tests identified in the BARs were in accordance with the agency's official test baseline, referred to as the Integrated Master Test Plan. But in 2020, DOD made some changesincluding more oversight from senior leadersto improve how missile defense acquisitions perform against cost, schedule, and capability goals. One notable absence is timelines and phases. The arrow missile defense program's initial cost was $1.6 billion, with an additional $3 million per missile produced. Even as threats increase, the new MDR states the United States will also continue to stay ahead of North Korean missile threats to the homeland through a comprehensive missile defeat approach, complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means. The use of missile defeat represents a subtle but important shift which applies broadly to the missile defense enterprise. Congress recently prohibited DOD from changing certain missile defense acquisition processes and responsibilities unless certain requirements were met. Most notably, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, rather than the MDA Director, now determines whether major MDA programs may progress through the development phases.